South Africa has declared human rights a cornerstone of its foreign policy. However, its denial of visas to the Dalai Lama to visit South Africa on three successive occasions is illustrative of the contradictions in the country's human rights foreign policy. South Africa's decision to promote Sino-South African relations rather than address the causes of the Dalai Lama's exile, and China's occupation of Tibet and poor human rights record has resulted in widespread media reaction in South Africa and abroad. Three related matters were highlighted, namely South Africa's human rights foreign policy; the country's visa diplomacy and its refusal of visas to the Dalai Lama to promote Sino-South African bilateral trade and diplomatic relations; and the media as a key domestic foreign policy actor. This study uses a constructivist approach. It concludes that the South African media framed and constructed the South African government's public and visa diplomacy in respect of the Dalai Lama from the ideational turn (the promotion of human rights) whereas South Africa's foreign policy is presented as replaced by a hegemonic turn in favour of China.
Global and local questions were raised about the motivation for South Africa's volte face resulting in wide local and international media reaction and coverage. Moreover, South Africa's stated human rights foreign policy was questioned, as well as the possible influence of China in respect of South Africa's refusal to grant a visa.
Against the aforesaid, this article addresses three neglected areas of South Africa's foreign policy, namely the country's visa diplomacy; its refusal of visas to the Dalai Lama as a human rights issue; and the media as a domestic foreign policy actor. South Africa is no stranger to visa diplomacy; having been on the receiving end during apartheid due to international sanctions and embargoes prior to 1994. Since 1994 South Africa has seen the declaration of a number of individuals as personae non grata and denying visas to others (Mail & Guardian, 26 March 2014) . The aim is also to investigate the South African media as a domestic source of foreign policy, and how it constructed South Africa's foreign policy decision in respect of the Dalai Lama's intended visits; and the government's constructions in response to each denial. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, a constructivist approach is employed. It is thus assumed that international reality is cognitively and socially constructed to provide meaning to the material world, and that international politics is constructed by influential ideas, collective values, culture and social identities (Adler, 1997: 319) . In the Dalai Lama Affair, identities, interests and norms values were repeatedly highlighted by the South African government.
It is impossible to focus on all media coverage in the Dalai Lama saga. Therefore, the media set used for this study consisted predominantly of, but not limited to, the mainly the Gauteng-based publications of largest South African media group, Independent News & Media (hereafter Independent Media) on the basis of Kariithi's (2010) "reducing rectangles". The latter assumes that of everything taking place at a given moment, only a certain portion is noticed. Of all that is noticed, only a certain segment is recorded by the media. (Independent Media, 2015) . By June 2015, Independent Media's shareholders included Sekunjalo Media Consortium (the majority shareholder); the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) managed through the state-owned Public Investment Corporation (PIC); and Interacom Investment Holding Limited (China International Television Corporation [CITVC] ) and China-Africa Development Fund (CADFUND) (Independent Media 2015) .
As the Gauteng-published media are in the government's immediate environment, the South African government, therefore, pays most attention to these sources in considering its reaction to media reporting. For this research, news reports, feature articles, and editorials were included in the media set. The article is structured to analyse South Africa's post-apartheid human rights foreign policy and public diplomacy, the conditions surrounding the three visa denials to the Dalai Lama, the implications of these denials, and the South African government's construction of its justification of its decisions in each instance. Mandela (1993) stated that the settled norm of human rights would be "the light that guides South Africa's foreign policy". This set the tone for South Africa's foreign policy in the aftermath of apartheid, with the incumbent African National Congress (ANC) government declaring the promotion of human rights as a foreign policy priority.
Despite this lofty ideal and repeated foreign policy mantra, South Africa's human rights foreign policy was repeatedly questioned stemming from, for example, its position on reported human rights abuses by the governments of, for instance, China and Zimbabwe; its human rights-related voting record as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2007 to 2008 and again from 2011 to 2012 and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC); as well as its decisions to decline visas to the 14 th Dalai Lama (SAIIA, 2009) . Despite these questions, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, confirmed that there had been "no change in the fundamental underpinnings of our [South Africa's] foreign policy since the advent of our democracy in 1994" and that "our stand on human rights is still the same" (DFA, 2007) . Apart from embracing a normative dimension of South Africa's foreign policy, the country also embraces public diplomacy as a practical dimension of its foreign policy as a particular type and practice of diplomacy (Melissen, 2011) . The media is therefore recognised as one of the instruments in a state's conduct of public diplomacy; referred to as the "centralised mass-media approach" to public diplomacy whereby governments need to correct daily perceived constructions or misrepresentations of their policies and attempt to convey a longer-term strategic message (Nye, 2010) . The main strength of the mass-media approach is its audience reach, ability to generate public awareness, and to set the policy and political agenda (Nye, 2010) . There is thus a link between foreign policy, public diplomacy and media liaison. How a government goes about conducting these relations with the media can result in either good or tense government-media relations. In fact, the South African government has The South African media further reacted by describing the government's refusal as a "disgrace"; referring to South Africa's "spinelessness on the international stage" as "embarrassing" (Weekend Argus, 22 March 2009). It also argued that the world, like South Africans, had become accustomed to the South African government's "extraordinary hypocrisy" in foreign relations as politicians paid lip-service to principles; yet thoughtless pragmatism governed foreign policy (Weekend Argus, 22 March 2009). Regarding the argument that the Dalai Lama's visit would divert attention from the focus of the 2009 peace conference, the media suggested that government officials would have realised that the snub they were defending was creating more publicity than allowing the Dalai Lama to attend the conference (Daily News, 24 March 2009). There were also media suggestions that there would soon be proof enough that the ANC decided to ban the Dalai Lama because of all the Chinese money that went into the party's coffers. The media further argued that, increasingly, the world could be divided into those countries that were succumbing to pressure from China, and those that were not; with South Africa falling into the former category.
The media further referred to the "one-China policy" that meant accepting that Taiwan was a renegade province of China that had to return to the mother country (Pretoria News, 30 March 2009). China's apparent mounting sensitivity about the Dalai Lama implied that the policy had been secretly extended to Tibet. It was noted that China proffered that part of the respect they accorded to Africa was not to impose conditions on their aid, as Western nations did. The paradox was that by enforcing this "no-meet-the-Dalai Lama policy" at the risk of losing aid, Beijing was The media also argued that China would not stop investing or trading with South Africa if the government allowed the Dalai Lama to visit the country and suggested that cash might have been secured for the ANC, which could be cut off without affecting the Chinese economy (Pretoria News, 6 October 2011). Moreover, the media commented that it seemed that all pretence at finding a balance between practical and principled considerations in South African foreign policy had been abandoned (Cape Times, 5 October 2011).
Moreover, the media described South Africa's approach as "unaccountable, secretive and disrespectful"; accusing the South African government of pursuing a "cynical strategy" over the planned visit by the Dalai Lama by delaying to grant a visa so that the Dalai Lama had to cancel his visit (Cape Times, 5 October 2011). In response, the South African government claimed it never came under any pressure from China to prevent the Dalai Lama from visiting and would have given the Dalai Lama a visa had he not cancelled. This explanation was seen as "implausible".
The South African government sought to look unhurried and strong in considering the Tibetan spiritual leader's application for a visa. Instead, it showed weakness and an inability to deal with tricky situations. An explanation by the President saying no Clayson Monyela, DIRCO Deputy Director-General of Public Diplomacy, responded by indicating it was not "proper" to answer "hypothetical" questions on whether South Africa would have approved the visa application, or not. It was remarked that South Africa was losing its hard-fought reputation as a champion of human rights and its independence (The Star, 3 October 2014). The decision was also seen as evidence of "cynical national interests" triumphing over the government's professed idealism (The Witness, 3 October 2014). The media also accused the South African government of not having "the guts to stand in public and defend its decisions, choosing instead to remain silent" (Times Live, 3 October 2014). The media further argued that the decision, or "indecision", exposed South Africa's falsehood of BRICS (the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping) being an organisation of equals (Pretoria News, 6 October 2014).
Cape Town Mayor Patricia de Lille, a member of the DA, and host to the said conference, confirmed that the decision to move the event to another city would cost the city ZAR 60 million in lost economic opportunities, tourism and job creation (Cape Argus, 3 February 2014) . She said the primary reason for the relocation was the fact that the South African government refused to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama. She explained that she had contacted The [South African] Presidency in March 2014 about the prospect of hosting the summit, only to get a response at the end of August 2014. A group of 14 Nobel Laureates had also appealed to President Jacob Zuma to grant the Dalai Lama a visa, with no acknowledgement. Seemingly, the South African government had treated these requests with disdain and showed they were more intent on pleasing Beijing than ensuring that a prestigious international event was held in South Africa. They had undermined South Africa's international standing and embarrassed the country, suggesting that South Africa was being "sold Against the aforesaid, it can be deduced that, as South Africa's relations with China consolidated, its rejection of the Dalai Lama escalated. In 2009, the South African government was keen to interact with the media in an attempt to put defendable arguments in the communication environment. However, its approach to media reaction in 2011 was very different to its approach in 2009 in that the government increasingly attempted to evade, rather than to engage, with the media about the issue. The avoidance and denial tactics did little to arrest the fury expressed in the media about the way the government handled the 2014 application. Very little was learned from previous experiences and the government chose to go the same route with the 2014 application, with more or less the same result. The government merely followed the 2011 approach in getting the Dalai Lama to cancel his visit to South Africa. It then created the impression that the application was still under review when the trip was called off. Harsh media criticism and public outcries resulted in both instances from the government's apparent reluctance to handle the matter through public diplomacy platforms; due to, inter alia, political pressure from China, lacking a convincing communications strategy and ineffective government communication.
Implications of visa denials
The Dalai Lama Affair has had several implications for South Africa's human rights foreign policy; formulations of South Africa's national interests; the country's public 
South Africa's human rights foreign policy
With its emphasis on human rights, South Africa has managed to uphold a rhetorical advantage in its post-1994 foreign policy. However, the Dalai Lama Affair illustrated the selective application (and thus discriminatory nature) of South Africa's human rights policy. As a result, a strong and critical media voice emerged accusing the South African government of abandoning human rights principles under pressure from China for the sake of beneficial trade relations.
In response, the South African government maintained that abiding to the spirit of the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) and a commitment to international human rights was less in South Africa's interests than kowtowing to China (Weekend Argus, 2 March 2009). Analysts explained that there was not necessarily a conflict between the pursuit of values and national interests; rather, values were often intangible forms of national interests (The Mercury, 29 March 2010). The South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) enjoined the government to pursue a balanced foreign policy, both value-based and interest-driven. However, a lack of consensus on what constituted the national interests bedeviled this balance. Despite the very strong media attack on South Africa's foreign policy and human rights credentials, the South African government did very little to defend itself in this respect, but chose to make it a national interest issue. In its response, the ANC, the governing party, merely maintained that this decision did not compromise South Africa's stand on human rights. The South African government's silence on China's human rights record is in stark contrast to, for example, South Africa's diplomacy of anger vis-a-vis Israel's human rights policy in respect of Palestinians (see Hall, 2011: 521-555 (BBC, 2000) .
National interests and the Dalai Lama Effect
In an effort to ease pressure on it, the South African government explained that its intention to advance the country's national interests justifies its decision to deny visas to the Dalai Lama. The media framed this justification as "bowing to pressure" from China (Mail & Guardian, 28 September 2011 policy" than any Western nation would dare to . This is indicative of the so-called Dalai Lama Effect, which refers to China's influence over states hosting or planning to host the Dalai Lama (Fuchs and Klann, 2011) . The Chinese administration threatens, in a more-or-less open manner, that meetings between its trading partners' officials and the Dalai Lama will be met with animosity and lead to subsequent deterioration in their trade relationships. Research has shown that China has rewarded states denying visas to the Dalai Lama and has instituted punitive measures against states hosting and supporting the Dalai Lama (Fuchs and Klann 2011) . This is also evident in Sino-South African relations since 2009 (the first denial of a visa to the denial); a period which coincides with Jacob Zuma's presidency. In fact, Alden and Wu (2014: 15) concluded that "two-way trade has flourished under the Zuma administration", with China becoming South Africa's largest trading partner during this period.
As the South African government admitted in 2009 it had refused the Dalai Lama a visa to attend the peace conference, it also explained that it was "not in South Analysts argued that South Africa's indecision, incompetently tossing the application from one official to the other, was informed by a desire to please "new colonial master" China (The Star, 6 October 2011). Like 2009, and despite protestation from the South African government, the media consensus was that the government gave in to pressure from China in not granting a visa to the Dalai Lama. It is noteworthy from the coverage in the media set monitored that whereas the government did not do much to contest the human rights angle to the story, it did, however, challenge the accusation that it took the decision under pressure from China.
Suzette van der Westhuizen and Jo-Ansie van Wyk i.e. the issuance or denial of a visa to enter a country in order to express a particular diplomatic position and to influence another actor (Stringer, 2004: 2) . Defined as a "tangible measure used to communicate a government's diplomatic mood", visa diplomacy is, therefore, a particular instrument of a state's foreign policy used to coerce or consent; restrict or enable global mobility (Stringer, 2004: 6 The South African government was perhaps more reluctant to use the public diplomacy instrument, and was most likely only forced into putting its position on the matter in the public domain by the outcry from media and civil society against its disinclination to issue visas to the Dalai Lama. The South African government was mostly prompted for information on the situation, first insisting that no invitation had been extended to the Dalai Lama; then stating that it had decided it was not in South Africa's interest to invite the Dalai Lama, putting forward the argument that the Dalai Lama would divert the attention from the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the peace conference (iol, 22 March 2009; Pretoria News, 23 March 2009) . The South African government eventually added that it was also faced with the choice of either allowing the Dalai Lama access or damaging relations with China, but rejected suggestions that it had denied him entry under pressure from China (The Mercury, 26 March 2009).
The progressive divulgence of the government's stance seems to prove that its hand might have been forced into acceding to handling this on a public diplomacy platform. It may much rather have used traditional "silent" diplomacy techniques to address the issue, but the civil society and media sentiment on the matter was such that it had to state its case in public.
The same reluctance to divulge information was evident around the 2011 visa dispute. South Africa initially maintained that the Dalai Lama had not applied for a visa in New Delhi (The Mercury, 1 April 2009). In 2011, the government was even more secretive about the process and eventually did not take a decision at all. The only statement on the issue really offered voluntarily was the unfortunate assertion that the visa would have been granted had the Dalai Lama not cancelled his visit (iol, 5 October 2011). It seems a valid observation from both events that government only went public on the matter under duress.
As in 2009, utterances by the Chinese government around the 2014 visa application from the Dalai Lama were to a certain extent more revealing that those of the South African government. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Qin Gang, thanked South Africa for its support saying China highly appreciated the respect given by the South African government to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the support given to China on this issue (FMPRC, 2014) Again in 2014, the South African government maintained that it had not denied the Dalai Lama a visa, because he had effectively cancelled his own application by indicating he would not be attending the summit (The Citizen, 4 October 2014). In this instance, local government through Cape Town Mayor Patricia de Lille communicated on the matter accusing the national government of scuppering the summit by denying the Dalai Lama a visa (Cape Argus, 3 February 2014) . As with the previous applications, national government only communicated on the matter when there was no other option.
The messenger and the message: media and foreign policy
Internationally, the media's role and functions in international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy is accepted as the so-called CNN Effect (Robinson, 1999: 301-309; Gilboa, 2005: 27-44) or the Al Jazeera Effect (Seib, 2008) . The newsworthiness of Sino-South African relations for the South African media lies in, amongst others, the rapid expansion of these bilateral relations; historical ties; and continued expressions of solidarity in global affairs. It also lays in the contradictions -such as human rights issues -emanating from these relations. Therefore, the South African media often view Beijing and Pretoria's relations in normative terms; supporting the notion that the South African media has a binary ("friend or foe; predator or partner; profit or plunder") view of China (Wasserman, 2012: 341) . This binary view was also evident in the media's framing of the Dalai Lama Affair questioning the South African government's national interests. Instead, the media reframed these visa denials as South Africa's bowing to pressure from China and thus contradicting South Africa's human rights foreign policy. Whereas the media heavily criticised the South African government's handling of the Dalai Lama Affair, it was relatively silent on criticising China for pressurising South Africa; China's occupation of Tibet; and its treatment of the Dalai Lama.
Even if opinions expressed through the media do not actually change foreign policy, they do influence the content of public diplomacy messaging. The media and those quoted in the media could not sway the government to change its position on granting a visa to the Dalai Lama, but the government was pushed to review the content of its messages or its approach to the issue as indicated above.
After the 2009 invitation it even seemed as if government may have been convinced to review its visa diplomacy, with an undertaking that the Dalai Lama would be welcomed in future. Still, when faced with the 2011 and 2014 invitations, it was clear that this was not the case. The study also made it clear that the priorities of human rights and national interests cannot always be pursued in concord. This sentiment was expressed by analysts, but the government did not see its way clearly to articulate this angle in public communication.
Conclusion
Despite a shared historical experience of colonialism; foreign domination; exiled liberation leaders and movements; and human rights advocacy, South Africa has no historical or present diplomatic relations with Tibet; unlike South Africa's relations with states such as Timor Leste, the Sahrawi Arab Republic, South Sudan and others. The Dalai Lama is an important international figure, and was considered both the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet until his "political retirement" in 2011 (His Holiness the 14 th Dalai Lama of Tibet, Undated). As a Nobel Peace laureate he is also an important diplomatic and ceremonial actor but who's diplomatic status is compromised by his exile and his state's occupation by China, a global superpower and a permanent member of the UNSC.
The South African media reviewed for this research payed considerable attention to the Dalai Lama Affair, while displaying predominantly negative media attitudes towards the South African and Chinese governments. Moreover, the main themes emanating from media reaction was South Africa's inability to withstand Chinese pressure, and that this poorly reflects on our human rights foreign policy. The public diplomacy efforts of the South African government stand in stark contrast to this. Here, media attention was often reactive; negative towards the Dalai Lama, but positive towards China; with the benefits from maintaining and improving SinoSouth African relations in order to enhance South Africa's national interests the major theme. The South African government was also aware of its place branding in respect of, for example, the 2010 FIFA World Cup which, it seemed, turned out to be South Africa's competitive branding vis-a-vis the Dalai Lama.
The Dalai Lama Affair is likely to be repeated in future as South Africa consolidates its relations with China even further. It is hoped that the media will retain its robustness in respect of South Africa's foreign policy. Moreover, the Dalai Lama Affair is also a call to democratise South Africa's foreign policy to reflect public opinion, including that of the media.
Endnotes

1.
In-group preference or bias, is a pattern of conduct favouring members of the own group over those who are not within the group.
